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28.1 Introduction
Sensor technology and data processing are constantly improving in their performance.
This enables both: continuous further development of driver assistance systems and
increasing automation of the driving task, right up to self-driving vehicles [1].
In the following chapter the author traces the technical improvements in vehicle safety
over recent decades, factoring in growing consumer expectations. Considering Federal
Court of Justice rulings on product liability and economic risks, he depicts requirements
that car manufacturers must meet. For proceedings from the ﬁrst idea until development to
sign, he recommends interdisciplinary, harmonized safety and testing procedures. He
argues for further development of current internationally agreed-upon standards including
tools, methodological descriptions, simulations, and guiding principles with checklists.
These will represent and document the practiced state of science and technology, which
has to be implemented in a technically viable and economically reasonable way.
28.1.1 Motivation
In the course of this development, technical, especially electrical/electronic systems and
software are becoming far more complex in the future. Therefore, safety will be one of the
key issues in future automobile development and this results in a number of major new
challenges, especially for car manufacturers and their developers. In particular, changing
vehicle guidance from being completely human-driven, as it has so far been, to being
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highly or fully automated, raises fundamental questions regarding responsibility and
liability. This calls for new approaches—ﬁrst and foremost new safety and testing con-
cepts [2]. From the legal point of view, automated vehicles require protective safety
measures in the development process [3]. The remaining risk must be accepted by users.
According to a judgment by the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, or
BGH), such vehicles must be possible to construct—within the limits of what is techni-
cally possible and economically reasonable—according to the respective current
state-of-the-art, state-of-science, and must enter the market in a suitably sufﬁcient form to
prevent damage [4].
28.1.2 Questions of Increased Automation’s Product Safety
Media reports on car manufacturers, suppliers and IT companies’ automated research
vehicles have predicted for years the preparation for the development of self-driving
vehicles, produced in series. Several things still need to be in place however, before these
vehicles can be launched on the market. Increasing automation of vehicle guidance calls
for cutting-edge, highly complex technology. Particularly with the use of
electric/electronic hard- and software, unforeseeable reactions have to be expected, which
in the worst cases may even be danger to life and limb. Due to the growing complexity,
fully automating all driving tasks in driverless vehicles (see [3])—without a human driver
as a backup—currently involves risks, which are difﬁcult to assess. In addition, there are
new liability questions and limited tolerance for technical failure. While over 3000 deaths
in road trafﬁc currently seem to be acceptable to society in Germany, there is likely to be
zero tolerance for any fatal accident involving presumable technical failure. Although
automation in driving promises considerable potential safety beneﬁts, the comprehensive
commercialization of driverless vehicles can only take place when questions surrounding
who is liable and responsible for damage caused by technological systems have been
clariﬁed. Acceptance by society may only occur when amongst other things, the beneﬁts
perceived by the individual clearly exceed the experienced risks.
An in-depth analysis of automated vehicles’ risks to be considered, based on many
years’ experience in research and product liability, will provide basics for preparing their
future series development and commercialization. From this, recommendations for safety
assessment will be concluded. To date, amongst others, the following questions remain
unsolved:
– How safe is safe enough?
– How is the duty of care assured during development?
– What requirements need consideration when developing and marketing safe automated
vehicles?
– Under what conditions is an automated vehicle considered defective?
590 T. Winkle
28.1.3 Technical Continued Development of Assistance
Systems—New Opportunities and Risks
From a technical point of view, automated vehicles are presently already able to autono-
mously take-over all driving tasks in moving trafﬁc. Current series-production vehicles
with an optimized sensor, computer, and chassis technologies enable assistance systems
with increasing greater performance. Some of the driver-assistance systems on the market
today give warning when they recognize dangers in parallel or cross trafﬁc (Lane Departure
Warning, Collision-, Lane Change-, Night Vision- and Intersection-Assistance). Others
intervene in the longitudinal and lateral dynamics (e.g. anti-lock braking—ABS, Electronic
Stability Control—ESC, Adaptive Cruise Control—ACC). Active parking/steering assis-
tance systems provide increased convenience by interventions of steering and braking at
low speeds. These partially automated vehicle systems, with temporary longitudinal and
lateral assistance, are currently offered for series-production vehicles, but exclusively on
the basis of an attentive driver being able to control the vehicle. Supervision by a human
driver is required. During normal operation at and beyond the system limits, the system
limits or failures of these Advanced Driver Assistance Systems, or ADAS, are thus
compensated by the proof of controllability due to the driver (see [5, 6]).
For fully automated driving on the other hand, the driver is no longer available as a
backup for the technical limits and failures. This replacing of humans, acting by their own
responsibility, with programmed machines goes along with technical and legal risks, as
well as challenges for product safety. However, future expectations regarding driverless
vehicles—even in a situation of possible radical change—can only be described as using
previous experience. Analogies based on past and present expectations concerning vehicle
safety will therefore be examined in the following section.
28.2 Expectations Regarding Safety of Complex Vehicle
Technology
28.2.1 Rising Consumer Expectations for Vehicle Safety
Fully automated vehicles must be measured against today’s globally high level of consumer
awareness in vehicles’ failures. Since 1965, critical awareness regarding the car industry has
evolved more and more, strengthened by the book Unsafe at Any Speed—The Designed-In
Dangers of the American Automobile [7, 8]. In this publication, the author Ralph Nader
blamed car makers for cost savings and duty-of-care breaches at the expense of safe con-
struction and production. With its presentation of safety and construction deﬁciencies at
General Motors and other manufacturers, the book’s content scared the public. Nader went
on to found the Center for Study of Responsive Law, which launched campaigns against the
“Big Three” automobile manufacturers in North America, Volkswagen and other car
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companies. Technical concepts were subsequently reworked and optimized. At the center of
Nader’s criticism was the Chevrolet Corvair. Amongst other things, Nader criticized the
unsafe vehicle dynamics resulting from the rear-mounted engine and swing axle. Under
compression or extension, it changed the camber (inclination from the vertical axis). By a
design modiﬁcation into an elastokinematic twist-beam or a multilink rear suspension, the
inclination remains largely unchanged, which results in more stable driveability and han-
dling. Later, the VW Beetle also came under ﬁre for similar reasons due to its sensitivity to
crosswinds. It was also designedwith a rear-mounted engine and a swing axle. As a technical
improvement VW therefore replaced the Beetle with the Golf, with a front engine,
front-wheel drive and more stable handling (market introduction 1974).
Besides the development of new vehicles that were of better design and drove more
safely, a further consequence of this criticism was the establishment of the US National
Highway Trafﬁc Safety Administration (NHTSA), located within the Department of
Transportation. Based on the Highway Safety Act of 1970, it improves road trafﬁc safety.
It sees its task as protecting human life, preventing injury, and reducing accidents. Fur-
thermore, it provides consumers with vehicle-speciﬁc safety information that had previ-
ously been inaccessible to the public. Moreover, the NHTSA accompanies numerous
investigations of automobile safety systems to this day. Amongst other things, it has
actively promoted the compulsory introduction of Electronic Stability Control (ESC).
Parallel to NHTSA activities, statistics from the German Federal Motor Transport
Authority (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt, or KBA) also show increasingly sensitive ways in
handling safety-related defects, by supporting and enforcing product recalls [9]. Fur-
thermore, there are now extremely high expectations for vehicle safety. This also can be
seen in the extensive safety equipment expected today in almost every series production
vehicle across the globe. It includes anti-lock braking (ABS), airbags, and Electronic
Stability Control (ESC). The frequency of product recalls has increased, despite passenger
vehicles’ general reliability and functional safety noticeably rising at the same time.
Endurance tests in trade magazines such as Auto Motor und Sport show that a distance of
100,000 km can be obtained more often without any breakdowns, unscheduled time in the
garage, or defective parts, and without any defect.
28.2.2 Risks and Benefits of Automated Vehicles
Automated vehicles will arguably only gain acceptance within society when the perceived
beneﬁt (depending on the degree of efﬁciency: “driver” versus “robot”) outweighs the
expected risks (depending on the degree of automation: “area of action” versus “area of
effectiveness”). In order to minimize the risks, manufacturers carry out accident-data
analysis and corresponding risk management (see Fig. 28.1).
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For car manufacturers and their suppliers, automated vehicles are an interesting product
innovation with new marketing possibilities. Investment decisions and market launches
however involve risks that are difﬁcult to assess:
– What risks exist for product liability claims when autonomous vehicles do not meet the
requirements of a safe product?
– Which failures may lead to product recalls?
– Will the brand image be sustainably damaged if the automated vehicle does not
comply with consumer expectations?
28.3 Legal Requirements and Effects
Society’s and individual expectations of technical perfection in vehicles are rising. Higher
demands in vehicle quality and functions also call for corresponding safety measures when
rolling out automated vehicles. This for example can be seen in the increase of recall
campaigns despite increasing technical vehicle-reliability or additional requirements and
standards. Applicable comprehensive safety campaigns, such as the Motor Vehicle Safety
Defects and Recalls or new obligations for documentation by public authorities also indicate
increasing requirements. One example of the latter is the Transportation Recall Enhance-
ment, Accountability and Documentation (TREAD) Act in the USA [10], which introduced
a series of new and extensive obligations for documentation and report-keeping for the
National Highway Trafﬁc Safety Administration (NHTSA). At the same time, human errors
in road trafﬁc are sanctioned individually, without bringing the whole road transport system
itself into question.
Highly complex technologies and varying deﬁnitions slow down any launch of auton-
omous vehicles. In addition, the interdisciplinary context contains various technical






























Fig. 28.1 Societal and individual user acceptance may occur contextually, while consumers weigh up
the perceived beneﬁcial options and fear for risks in the relevant contexts (see Chaps. 29, 30). Risks
depend on the level of automation, beneﬁts of the degree in efﬁciency. Risk management and accident
data analysis (see Chap. 17) allow for objectivities (see Chap. 30) and optimization. Image rights: Autor
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such as “generally accepted good engineering practice”, “generally recognized and legally
binding codes of practice”, “industry standards”, or the “state of the art.”With its decision of
06/16/2009, the German Federal Supreme Court of Justice (BGH) wanted to ramp up
requirements for the automotive industry and surprisingly shaped the term “latest state of the
art and science”. This creates additional challenges for developers. Functions that are cur-
rently feasible in research vehicles for scientiﬁc purposes are under laboratory conditions far
from fulﬁlling expectations for series production vehicles, e.g. protection from cold, heat,
vibrations, water, or dirt.
From a developer’s point of view, these legal requirements for a careful development
of new complex systems can only be fulﬁlled after validation tests. These should ideally
be internationally harmonized and standardized. The German BGH judgment from 2009
explained these development requirements—excluding economic and technical suitability
for production—with “… all possible design precautions for safety …” based on
“state-of-the-art and science” [4] on the basis of an expert opinion for the preservation of
evidence. This opinion, however, requires ultrasound sensors as redundancy for recog-
nition of critical objects to trigger airbags. It should be possible, “… to attach ultrasound
sensors around the vehicle which sense contact with an object and are in addition veriﬁed
by existing sensors before airbag deployment …” [4].
This expert opinion for the preservation of evidence however from an engineering
point of view is more than questionable, as current sensor designs only permit a range of a
few meters in series production vehicles. Subject to the current state of the art, the
application of ultrasonic sensor systems is limited to detecting static surroundings at slow
speeds in the scope of parking assistance. The sensors’ high-frequency sound waves can
be disturbed by other high frequency acoustic sources such as jackhammers or trucks and
buses’ pneumatic brakes, which can lead to false detections. Also poorly reflecting sur-
faces will not lead to a reflection of sound waves. Object recognition is then entirely
excluded [11]. Furthermore, the lawsuit ﬁnally concluded that the sensor system con-
cerned worked error-free according to the technical speciﬁcation.
In addition, the previous fundamental BGH judgment requires that risks and beneﬁts be
assessed before market launch:
Safety measures are required which are feasible to design according to the state of the art and
science at the time of placing the product on the market … and in a suitable and sufﬁcient
form to prevent damage. If certain risks associated with the use of the product cannot be
avoided according to state of the art and science, then it must be veriﬁed - by weighing up the
risks, the probability of realization, along with the product beneﬁts connected – whether the
dangerous product can be placed on the market at all. [4]
28.3.1 Generally Accepted Rules of Technology
An interpretation of the term “generally accepted rules of technology” (allgemein
anerkannte Regeln der Technik, or aaRdT) as a basic rule was shaped in a German
594 T. Winkle
Imperial Court of Justice (Reichsgericht) judgment from 1910 based on a decision from
1891 during criminal proceedings concerning Section 330 of the German Penal Code (§
330 StGB) in the context of building law:
Generally accepted rules of technology are addressed as those, resulting from the sum of all
experience in the technical ﬁeld, which have been proven in use, and wherever correctness
experts in the ﬁeld are convinced.
In various legal areas, they have different meanings. In terms of product liability,
generally accepted rules of technology concern minimum requirements. Noncompliance
to the rules would indicate the required safety has not been reached. They are described in
DIN-VDE regulations, DIN standards, accident prevention regulations, and VDI guide-
lines, amongst others [12].
28.3.2 The Product Safety Law (ProdSG)
The German Product Safety Law (Produktsicherheitsgesetz, or ProdSG), in its revised
version of 11/08/2011 establishes rules on safety requirements and consumer products. Its
predecessor was the Equipment and Product Safety Law (Geräte- und Produktsicher-
heitsgesetz, or GPSG) of 01.05.2004, which in turn had replaced the Product Safety Law
(Produktsicherheitsgesetz, or ProdSG) of 22.04.1997 and the Equipment Safety Law
(Gerätesicherheitsgesetz, GSG) of 24.06.1968. Section 3 GSG it describes the general
requirements for providing products on the market:
A product may … only be placed on the market if its intended or foreseeable use does not
endanger the health and safety of persons. [13]
28.3.3 The Product Liability Law (ProdHaftG)
Independent of its legal basis for a claim, the term “product liability” commonly refers to a
manufacturer’s legal liability for damages arising from a defective product. A manufac-
turer is whoever has produced a ﬁnal product, a component product, a raw material, or has
attached its name or brand name to a product. For product liability in Germany, there are
two separate foundations for claims. The ﬁrst basis is fault based liability, as found in
Section 823 of the German Civil Code (BGB) [13]; the second is strict liability regardless
of negligence or fault related to the tortfeasor, as contained in the Product Liability Law.
Section 1 of the Product Liability Law (ProdHaftG—Law Concerning Liability for
Defective Products) of 12/15/1989 describes the consequences of fault as:
If a person is killed or his or her body or health injured, or if property is damaged, due to a
defect of a product, the manufacturer of the product is thus obliged to compensate the injured
parties for any losses. [14]
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Independently of whether the product defect is caused intentionally or through negli-
gence, a defect is deﬁned in Section 3 of ProdHaftG as follows:
A product is defective when it is lacking safety which the public at large is entitled to expect,
taking into account the presentation of the product, the reasonably expected use of the product
and the time when the product was put into circulation. [14]
Should damage arise from a defective product, the Product Liability Law regulates the
liability of the manufacturer. Firstly, this entails potential claims of civil liability for
property damage, ﬁnancial losses, personal injury, or compensation for pain and suffering.
Liability rests primarily with the manufacturer. In justiﬁed cases suppliers, importers,
distributors, and vendors may also be made liable without limitation. Furthermore, in
cases of legally founded criminal liability, there may also be particular consequences for
top management or individual employees, if it is proven that risks were not minimized to
an acceptable level (see Fig. 28.3). In cases of serious fault or depending on the offense as
negligence, this may involve criminal personal proceedings against a developer.
Besides the potential legal consequences, manufacturers must also expect considerable
negative economic effects. Negative headlines in the media can lead to substantial loss in
proﬁts or revenue, damage to image, loss in trust and consequently loss of market share.
Therefore, when developing new systems, both consequences of potentially legal and
economic risks must be considered. Figure 28.2 gives an overview of the potential effects
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Fig. 28.2 Potential effects of failures in automated vehicles. Image rights: Author
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28.4 Product Safety Enhancement in Automated Vehicles
Based on Expert Knowledge from Liability and Warranty
Claims
28.4.1 Experience from Product Crises
In the future, safe automated vehicles will further depend on integrated quality manage-
ment systems [15, 16] and safe interactions [17]. In the past, advanced and successful
vehicles were frequently affected by product crises.
28.4.1.1 Defective Supplier Parts and -Systems
The following examples document how supplier parts and -systems triggered extensive
product crises.
The Ford Explorer was the worldwide best-selling sports utility vehicle. In the USA in
May 2000, the NHTSA contacted both the Ford and Firestone companies due to a con-
spicuously high rate of tires failing with tread separation. Ford Explorers, Mercury
Mountaineers, and Mazda Navajos were affected. All were factory-ﬁtted with Firestone
tires. At high speeds, tire failures led to vehicles skidding out of control and rollover
crashes with fatal consequences. Firestone tires on Ford Explorers were linked to over 200
fatalities in the USA and more than 60 in Venezuela. Ford and Firestone paid 7.85 million
dollars in court settlements. Overall compensation and penalties in total amounted to
369 million dollars. In addition to recalling several million tires at great expense, com-
munication errors were made during the crisis: the managers responsible publicly blamed
each other. This shattered friendly business relations between the two companies that
dated back over 100 years. Harvey Firestone had sold Henry Ford tires for the production
of his ﬁrst car as long ago as 1895. As the crisis progressed it led to serious damage to the
companies’ images, with sales collapsing for both parties [18].
General Motors (GM) announced a further example of defective supplier parts in
February 2014. As a consequence of the ﬁnancial crisis, the car company had been on the
brink of bankruptcy in 2009. It returned to proﬁt for the ﬁrst time, and won awards for its
new models, after a government bailout. But the ignition switches on some models had
seemingly been too weakly constructed since 2001, which meant the ignition key
sometimes jumped back to the “Off” position while driving. When this happened, not only
did the motor switch off, but the brake booster, power steering, and airbags also became
deactivated. GM engineers were accused of having ignored the safety defect in spite of
early warnings for more than ten years. The company has therefore already been ﬁned 35
million dollars for a delayed recall and now faces billions of dollars of damages claims
from accident victims and vehicle owners after mass product recalls [19].
Another huge airbag recall campaign by NHTSA involved 11 different vehicle manu-
facturers and more than 30 million vehicles only in the United States. Airbag Inflators
supplied by Takata ignited with explosive force. The inflator housing in some cases under
persistent high humidity as well as high temperature conditions could rupture with metal
28 Development and Approval of Automated Vehicles … 597
shards spraying throughout the passenger cabin and injured or killed car occupants. Several
fatalities and more than 100 injuries have been linked to this case which imposed a record
civil penalty of 200 million dollar. The airbags were installed worldwide in vehicles from
model year 2002 through 2015. Despite these injury risks the Department of Transportation
estimated that between 1987 and 2012 frontal airbags have saved 37,000 lives [20].
28.4.1.2 Alleged Sudden Unintended Accelerating or Decelerating
Vehicles
Vehicles that automatically intervene in longitudinal and lateral guidance hold consid-
erable risks and provide a target for those who assert that vehicles steer, accelerate and
decelerate in unintended, unexpected or uncontrolled ways. The accusation of unintended
acceleration due to alleged technical defects has already found some car manufacturers in
the media’s crossﬁre. Mainly in the USA, vehicles with automatic transmission are said to
have accelerated in an unintended manner by themselves, causing fatal accidents. Affected
drivers have initiated waves of lawsuits lasting for decades.
One example of this were the accusations against Toyota, a globally successful
company known for quality. Toyota came off very well in customer-satisfaction studies by
the American market research ﬁrm J. D. Power and Associates in 2002, 2004, and 2005.
In 2009, however, it faced accusations of alleged, unintended and sudden accelerating
vehicles. These were initially triggered by single incidents of sliding floor mats, which had
supposedly been responsible for gas pedals getting jammed. It was then argued that
vehicles would have accelerated unintentionally while driving due to the mechanically
jammed gas pedals. As Toyota had not responded to the allegations quickly enough in the
eyes of the NHTSA, the company was accused of covering up safety problems linked with
more than 50 deaths. As well as compensation payments, Toyota had to pay the authority
penalties of 66.15 million dollars. This was followed by extensive product recalls, claims
for damages and a record 1.2 billion dollar criminal penalty [21].
A further instance of a proven technical defect that led to unwanted accelerations can
be seen in an NHTSA recall action in June 2014. The software problem occurred in some
Chrysler Sport Utility Vehicles (SUV). When optional adaptive cruise control was acti-
vated and the driver temporarily pressed the accelerator pedal to increase (override)
vehicle’s set speed more than the cruise control system would on its own, the vehicle
could continue to accelerate briefly after the accelerator pedal was released again. In this
case and according to technical requirements the vehicle has to decelerate to the requested
set speed. There were no accident victims to lament. The short-notice initiated recall was
restricted to a mere 6042 vehicles [22].
Other great challenges already occurred because autonomous braking systems decel-
erated in some individual cases without a visible reason for the driver and put vehicles at
risk of a rear-end collisions. However, automatic braking and collision warning systems
have great potential in reducing road accidents and saving lives. After recognizing a
relevant crash object they can automatically apply the brakes faster than humans, slowing
the vehicle to reduce damage and injuries. Therefore these systems are recommended to
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be made standard equipment on all new cars and commercial trucks. Since November
2013 EU legislation has mandated Autonomous Emergency Braking Systems (AEBS) in
different stages with respect to type-approval requirement levels for certain categories of
motor vehicles to cover almost all new vehicles in the future [23].
According to NHTSA, the Japanese car manufacturer Honda Motor Company had to
recall certain model year 2014–2015 Acura vehicles with Emergency Braking. The reason
was that the Collision Mitigation Braking System (CMBS) may inappropriately interpret
certain roadside infrastructure such as iron fences or metal guardrails as obstacles and
unexpectedly apply the brakes [24]. Furthermore NHTSA investigated complaints
alleging unexpected braking incidents of the autonomous braking system in Jeep Grand
Cherokee vehicles with no visible objects on the road [25].
Another recall of Chrysler vehicles from 2015 July 24 was, in accordance with NHTSA
the ﬁrst, caused by a software hack. US researchers brought a moving Chrysler Jeep under
their control from afar, which forced the company to recall and ensure cyber-security of
their onboard software. The affected vehicles were equipped with Uconnect radio enter-
tainment systems from Harman International Industries. Software vulnerabilities could
allow third-party access to certain networked vehicle control systems via internet.
Exploitation of the software vulnerability could result in unauthorized manipulation and
remote control of certain safety related vehicle functions—such as engine, transmission,
brakes and steering—resulting in the risk of a crash [26].
In addition to the increase of recall actions the costs for penalties have increased
signiﬁcantly. In 2014 alone, NHTSA issued more than 126 million dollars in civil
penalties, exceeding the total amount collected by the agency during its forty-three year
history.
Many new technological risks for automated functions in future may not be visible
during development and testing. These issues arise in real-life trafﬁc situations and
developers have to make necessary changes to the technology ensuring real world trafﬁc
safety (see Sect. 28.4.7).
28.4.2 Essential Questions from Previous Product Liability Cases
The author’s own experience of previous product liability cases has shown that inter-
disciplinary structured development is a minimum requirement, especially for safe auto-
mated vehicles (see Sect. 28.4.6). In case of damage, the following questions are the key
for avoiding civil and criminal claims:
– Before developing a new product, has it already been checked for potential faults—
under consideration of the risks, the likelihood of their occurrence, and the beneﬁts—
whether the vehicle can be type-approved to be licensed for road trafﬁc use in the
intended technological speciﬁcation?
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Essentially, besides general type approval requirements, no globally agreed upon and
harmonized methods for fully automated vehicles exist today. These can be generated
using international legally binding development guidelines with checklists—similar to the
RESPONSE 3—ADAS Code of Practice for the Design and Evaluation of Advanced
Driver Assistance Systems (“ADAS with active support for lateral and/or longitudinal
control”) [5] linked to ISO 26262 [27] (Section 3, Concept phase, Page 24,
Controllability):
– What measures beyond purely legal framework were taken to minimize risk, damage,
and hazards?
Future guidelines will either be orientated towards today’s requirements or to a large
extend adopt them. The methods for evaluating risk during development (see Sect. 28.4.4)
ensure that no unacceptable personal dangers are to be expected when using the vehicle.
Therefore the general legally valid requirements, guidelines, standards and procedures
during the development process must at the very least, take into consideration as a
minimum requirement:
– Were generally accepted rules, standards, and technical regulations fulﬁlled?
Only complying with current guidelines is usually insufﬁcient. Furthermore it raises the
following questions:
– Was the system developed, produced, and sold with the required necessary care?
– Could the damage that occurred have been avoided or reduced in its effect with a
different design?
– How do competitors’ vehicles behave, or how would they have behaved?
– Would warnings have been able to prevent the damage?
– Were warnings in the user manuals sufﬁcient or additional measures required?
Whether an automated vehicle has achieved the required level of safety or not can be
seen at the end of the development process:
– Was a reasonable level of safety achieved with appropriate and sufﬁcient measures in
line with state of the art and science at the time it was placed on the market?
Even after a successful market introduction, monitoring of operation is absolutely
necessary. This is still the case when all legal requirements, guidelines, and quality
processes for potential malfunctions and safe use of the developed automated vehicle
functions have been complied with. The duty to monitor is the result of the legal duty to
maintain safety as found in Section 823 Paragraph 1 of the German Civil Code
(BGB) [13], where breach of duty triggers liability for any defect that should have been
recognized as such. This raises the concluding question for product liability cases:
– Was or is the automated vehicle being monitored during customer use?
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28.4.3 Potential Hazard Situations at the Beginning
of Development
The day-to-day experience of our technologically advanced society shows: risks and risky
behavior are an unavoidable part of life. Uncertainty and imponderables are no longer
seen as fateful acceptable events but rather as more or less calculable uncertainties [28].
The result of this are higher demands referring to risk management for the producers of
new technologies.
A structured analysis of the hazards in consideration of all possible circumstances can
help to give an initial overview of potential dangers. Therefore, in the early development
stages it makes sense to provide a complete speciﬁcation of the automated vehicle, to
ensure a logical hazard analysis and subsequent risk classiﬁcation (see Sect. 28.4.4).
On this basis, it is possible for an interdisciplinary expert team (see Fig. 28.6) to draw
up a list of well-known potentially dangerous situations at the start of a project. This
usually leads to a large number of relevant situations. Due to practical considerations,
scenarios for expert assessment and testing should later be restricted to the most relevant
(e.g. worldwide relevant test scenarios based on comprehensively linked up geographi-
cally deﬁned accident-, trafﬁc-flow- and weather data collections, see Chap. 17).
According to the system deﬁnition, it is recommended to initially gather situations in a
list or table. This should take the following into consideration:
– When should the automated function be reliably assured (normal function)?
– In what situations could automation be used in ways for which it is not designed for
(misinterpretation and potential misuse)?
– When are the performance limits for the required redundancy reached?
– Are dangerous situations caused by malfunctioning automation (failure, breakdown)?
Jointly drawing up a maximum number of dangerous situations relevant to the system
makes it likely that no potential major hazard is omitted or forgotten. Summarizing the
hazards with direct impact on safety is recommended as a next step. After cutting the
situations down to those that are actually safety-relevant, will technical solutions then be
developed.
28.4.4 Methods for Assessing Risks During Development
In discussing phasing out nuclear energy, a German Federal Government publication
states that German society—as a “community with a common destiny” and as part of the
“global community of risk”—wishes for progress and prosperity, but only accompanied
by controllable risks [29]. This is surely only partially transferable to road trafﬁc, where
risks of automated vehicles are limited—in contrast to nuclear energy - to a manageable
group of people. However, the speciﬁc requirements for the methods used in analyzing
and assessing risks are similar. Five common methods are outlined below.
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28.4.4.1 Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment
The hazard-analysis and risk-assessment procedure (H&R) is described and annotated in
ISO 26262 Part 3 for functional safety of complex electrical/electronic vehicle systems as
well as in the related ADAS Code of Practice for the development of active longitudinal
and lateral functions (referenced in ISO 26262-3, Concept phase) [5, 6]. Parts of the
methods given as examples in the following section (HAZOP, FMEA, FTA, HIL) also
point to the H&R. Aim of H&R is to identify the potential hazards of a considered unit, to
classify them, and set targets. This will enable dangers to be avoided, thus achieving a
generally acceptable level of risk. In addition, an “item” is judged on its impact on safety
and categorized to an Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL). An “item” is deﬁned in
ISO 26262 as a complex electrical/electronic system or a function that may contain
mechanical components of various technologies. The ASIL is ascertained through a
systematic analysis of possible hazardous situations and operating conditions. It also
involves an assessment of accident severity levels via Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) [30]
in connection with the probability of occurrence. A reduction to an assumed hardware
mean safety failure rate, e.g. ASIL D: < 10−8 h−1, for a social and individual accepted risk
(see Fig. 28.3) is achieved with external measures [27].
Basically, risk R can be expressed for an analytical approach as function F of the
frequency f with which a hazardous event occurs, and the potential severity of harm S of
the resulting damage:
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Fig. 28.3 Measures to increase safety for social and individual accepted risks. Image rights: Author
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The frequency f with which a hazardous event occurs is in turn influenced by various
parameters. One essential factor to consider is how often or how long a person is in a
situation where a hazard can occur (E = exposure). Another influence on whether a
hazardous event occurs, is if individuals and road users involved in the accident can react
with timely response, preventing potentially damaging effects (C = controllability).
Controllability via the driver, however, is not present in case of driverless and fully
automated vehicles participating in an accident. The product E × C is a measure of the
probability that a defect has the potential in a certain situation to have a corresponding
impact on the damage described.
A further factor (λ = failure rate) can be traced back to undetected random hardware
failures of system components and dangerous systematic errors remaining in the system. It
gives the frequency of occurrence with regard to E with which the automated vehicle can
trigger a hazardous event itself. The product f thus describes the number of events to be
expected during period E, e.g. kilometers driven or the number of times a vehicle is started.
f ¼ E  k ð28:2Þ
Furthermore, ISO 26262 stipulates that the Failure in Time (FIT) of technical and
electronic components must also be considered. The unit FIT gives the number of com-
ponents that fail within 109 h.
1 FIT ¼ 1 failure
109 hours of device operation
ð28:3Þ
Probability of occurrence f and—where possible—controllability C give the Auto-
motive Safety Integrity Levels: either ASIL rating into B, C (a recommended probability
of occurrence lower than 10−7 h−1, corresponding to a rate of 100 FIT) or D (required
probability of occurrence smaller than 10−8 h−1 corresponding to a rate of 10 FIT). The
highest requirements are thus for ASIL D. Besides normal vehicle operation, ISO 26262
also considers service requirements, up to decommissioning of the vehicle. In this regard,
developers should take the consequences of aging into account when selecting compo-
nents. Control units or sensors must be sufﬁciently protected by robust design in case they
were ﬁtted with age-sensitive electrolytic capacitors for energy reserves. A failure must
not suspend any important functions [27].
28.4.4.2 Hazard and Operability Study—HAZOP
A Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) is an early risk assessment, developed in the
process industry. A HAZOP looks for every imaginable deviation from a process in normal
operation and then analyzes the possible causes and consequences. Typically, a HAZOP
search is carried out systematically by a specialist team from the involved development
units. This is to reduce the likelihood of overlooking any important factors [5].
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28.4.4.3 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis—FMEA
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and the integrated Failure Mode, Effects and
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) are methods of analyzing reliability that identify failures
with signiﬁcant consequences for system performance in the application in question.
FMEA is based on a deﬁned system, module or component for which fundamental failure
criteria (primary failure modes) are available. It is a technique for validating safety and
estimating possible failure states in the speciﬁed design-review stage. It can be used from
the ﬁrst stage of an automation system design up to the completed vehicle. FMEA can be
used in the design of all system levels [31, 32].
28.4.4.4 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) involves identifying and analyzing conditions and factors that
promote the occurrence of a deﬁned state of failure that noticeably impacts system per-
formance, economic efﬁciency, safety, or other required properties. Fault trees are espe-
cially suitable for analyzing complex systems encompassing several functionally
interdependent or independent subsystems with varying performance targets. This par-
ticularly applies to system designs needing cooperation between several specialized
technical design groups. Examples of systems where Fault Tree Analysis is extensively
used include nuclear power stations, aircraft, communication systems, chemical and other
industrial processes.
The fault tree itself is an organized graphic representation of the conditions or other
factors causing or contributing to a deﬁned undesired incident, also known as the top
event [5]. One possible approach is to demonstrate the probability of road accidents by the
use of a fault tree which presumes both: inappropriate behavior and the existence of a
conflicting object [33].
Figure 28.4 shows an example for a Fault Tree Analysis. A single failure does not
necessarily have dangerous impact. This Fault Tree Analysis demonstrates that trafﬁc
accidents result by the coincidence of several causes. Series of unfortunate circumstances
and inappropriate behavior of trafﬁc participants can worsen the risk situation to be
uncontrollable. Human trafﬁc participants are the crucial link in the chain to prevent a car
crash (see Chap. 17). Especially automated vehicles will require appropriate safety
measures. Figure 28.4 demonstrates an excerpt of safety measures for a safe active
steering as used in automated vehicles.
28.4.4.5 Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) Tests
Increasing vehicle interconnection places particular demands on validating the safety of
the entire Electronic Control Unit (ECU) network, e.g. onboard wiring systems safety, bus
communication, vehicle-state management, diagnosis, and flash application’s behavior.
Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) tests can be used as soon as a hardware prototype of the
system or part of it,—e.g. an electronic control unit in a vehicle—is available. As the
Device under Test (DUT), the prototype is placed in a “loop,” a software-simulated virtual
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environment. This is designed to resemble the real environment as closely as possible.
The DUT is operated under real-time conditions [34].
28.4.4.6 Software-in-the-Loop (SIL) Tests
The method Software-in-the-Loop (SIL) in contrast to HIL, does not use special hardware.
The created model of the software is only converted to the code understandable for the
target hardware. This code is performed on the development computer with the simulated
model, instead of running as Hardware-in-the-Loop on the target hardware. SIL tests must
be applied before the HIL.
28.4.4.7 Virtual Assessment
Virtual assessment veriﬁes prospective, quantitative trafﬁc safety beneﬁts and risks (see
Sect. 28.1.2). They can be quantiﬁed using virtual simulation-based experimental tech-
niques. For this purpose trafﬁc scenarios can be modeled taking into account key
safety-relevant processes and stochastic simulation using large representative virtual
samples. Virtual representations of trafﬁc scenarios are based on detailed, stochastic
models of drivers, vehicles, trafﬁc flow, and road environment, along with their interac-
tions. The models include information from global accident data (see Chap. 17), Field
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Fig. 28.4 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA): functional safety measures prevent trafﬁc accidents caused by
technical active steering failures with the risk of personal injury. Image rights: Author
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Operation Tests (FOT), Natural Driving Studies (NDS), laboratory tests, driving simulator
tests, and other sources. Wide ranging, extensive simulations help identifying and eval-
uating safety relevant situations of automated vehicles.
28.4.4.8 Driving Simulator Tests
Driving simulator tests use models of vehicle dynamics and virtual driving scenarios.
They allow artiﬁcial driving situations and repeatable tests with various subjects. Poten-
tially hazardous trafﬁc scenarios can also be tested because in contrast to real driving the
virtual scenario is harmless. Different types of simulators, such as mock-up, ﬁxed based
simulator, or moving base simulator exist. Subjective and objective methods can be used
to measure the performance of test subjects in the driving task. Depending on the kind of
potentially hazardous situations, controllability can be tested by some of these methods.
Typical situations for driving simulator tests are high risk situations, driver take-over
reactions or interaction between automated driving system environment monitoring and
manual human driver mode.
28.4.4.9 Driving Tests and Car Clinics
Driving tests with different drivers provide useful feedback based on empirical data.
Dynamic car clinics allow testing of driver behaviour and performance while driving the
automated vehicle in deﬁned situations within a realistic environment. In a ﬁrst step the
objective is to identify relevant scenarios and environments (see Chap. 17). This makes it
possible to specify and implement virtual tests followed by conﬁrmation via driving tests
and car clinics on proving grounds. Finally, before sign-off and start of production (SOP),
ﬁeld tests conﬁrm identiﬁed scenarios and environments if necessary.
28.4.5 Approval Criteria from Expert Knowledge
During the approval process, test procedures must be provided. Approval criteria in terms
of “passed” and “not passed” are thus recommended for the ﬁnal safety veriﬁcation of
automated vehicles. Regardless of which methods were chosen for ﬁnal sign-off conﬁr-
mation, the experts should all agree on which test criteria sufﬁce for the vehicle to cope
successfully with speciﬁed situations during a system failure or malfunction. Generally
accepted values for achieving the desired vehicle reactions should be used for such
criteria. An evaluation can result by using established methods.
Taking the list of potentially hazardous situations as a basis (see Sect. 28.4.3), test
criteria for safe vehicle behavior, and if possible also globally relevant test scenarios, are
developed by internal and external experts. Of particular importance is a team of system
engineers and accident researchers. The former group offers knowledge of the precise
system functions, time factors, and experience of potential failures, while accident
researchers bring with them practical knowledge of high-risk trafﬁc situations (see
Chap. 17). Every known risky situation that a vehicle can get into must be considered. At
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least one corrective action with regard to safety requirements should be speciﬁed by the
developers for the risks identiﬁed. In terms of ﬁnal sign-off conﬁrmation, a test scenario
has thus been “passed” when the automated vehicle reacts as expected or otherwise deals
with the situation in a satisfactory accepted manner.
28.4.6 Steps to Increase Product Safety of Automated Vehicles
in the General Development Process
To guarantee the product safety of automated vehicles, a thorough development concept is
needed that is at least in line with state of the art and science. To this end, a general
development process is proposed below, as is principally in use amongst car manufac-
turers for the development of series production vehicles, partially with small adjustments.
For highly automated vehicles the development refers to measures regarding the safety
process, activities to ensure controllability and appropriate human machine interaction
(see Fig. 28.5).
The generic development process for fully automated vehicle functions even more
focuses on interdisciplinary networking expert knowledge, the safety process and is repre-
sented graphically as a V-Model (see Fig. 28.6). As well as the development stages for the
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Fig. 28.5 Development process for automated vehicles from the idea until market introduction—
involving the safety process, activities regarding controllability and human machine interaction.
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high automation it depicts logical sequences of product development phases and selected
milestones but not necessarily how long each stage lasts or the time between phases [5, 35].
The process thus forms a simpliﬁed representation in the form of a V-Model. This
allows for iteration loops within the individual development phases involving all parties.
Within this V-shaped process structure (see Fig. 28.6) elements of the safety process are
taken into consideration. In addition, early and regular involvement of interdisciplinary
expert groups is recommended. From the deﬁnition phase until validation, sign-off, and
start of production—interdisciplinary networking experts from research, (pre-)develop-
ment, functional safety, product analysis, legal services, trafﬁc safety, technology ethics,
ergonomics, production, and sales should participate in the development process.
In the development steps for advanced automated vehicles’ product safety functional
safety, stands out as a key requirement. It relates to the whole interaction between the
vehicle and its environment. Safe driver interaction and take-over procedures [1, 36]
should thus be considered when there is an interface necessary to the use case and
functionality. Concerning product safety, fully automated vehicles essentially include the
following ﬁve usage situations: Of prime importance is the functional safety of fully
automated vehicles within, at and also beyond the performance limits. Furthermore,
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Fig. 28.6 Development process for highly automated vehicles as a V-Model from the idea until
market introduction involving recommended interdisciplinary networking experts and the elements
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functional safety should be examined during and after system failures. Careful develop-
ment with regard to a safe usage of driverless vehicles must ensure that they are able to
recognize the criticality of a situation, decide on suitable measures for averting danger
(e.g. degradation, driving maneuver) that lead back to a safe state, and then carry out these
measures.
Figure 28.7 gives an overview of a possible workflow regarding ﬁnal sign-off, up to
decommissioning of a vehicle. In the ﬁnal stages of developing an automated vehicle, the
development team decides whether a ﬁnal safety test for validation is required. This serves
to conﬁrm that a sufﬁcient level of safety for production has been reached. For this, the
development team veriﬁes that a vehicle reacts as previously predicted or in other ways
appropriate to the situation. The data used here may come from risk-assessment methods
used during development, such as hazard and risk analysis. There are three equally valid
paths for signing off vehicles. A direct sign-off will be carried out through an
experience-based recommendation of the development team. In addition, ﬁnal evidence of
safety can be passed after corresponding reconﬁrmation via an interdisciplinary forum of
internal and external experts or an objective proof. Evidence of functional safety is pos-
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trafﬁc-flow-, weather- and vehicle operation data (see Chap. 17), or other veriﬁable
samples (see Fig. 28.7).
The development team chooses an appropriate path for each individual scenario.
A mixed approach is also possible. When the safety team has conclusively conﬁrmed the
safety of the system design functionality, the ﬁnal sign-off can be given (see [5]).
28.4.7 Product Monitoring After Market Launch
Subsequent to the careful development, a manufacturer is obliged to monitor automated
vehicles after placing them on themarket, in order to recognize previously unknown hazards
and take necessary additional safety measures. If necessary, car manufacturers are urged to
analyze potential dangers (that can also arise in unintended use or misuse) and react with
appropriate measures, such as product recalls, redesign, or user information (see Fig. 28.7).
A judgment of the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) is often quoted amongst
product safety experts as a particular example of the product-monitoring duty for com-
bination risks with third-party accessories. Model-speciﬁc motorbike handlebar cladding,
from accessories that had ﬁrst been passed by ofﬁcially recognized experts from a testing
organization in June 1977, were supposed to have been responsible for three spectacular
accidents including one fatality. On the day before the fatal accident, the motorcycle
manufacturer in question wrote personal letters to warn all the riders of the affected model
it had on record. The victim, however, never received the letter. Although the motorbike
manufacturer expressly warned of using the cladding, the company was ordered to pay
damages. The BGH’s judgment in the matter established a pioneering principle:
In future, companies will not only be required to monitor the reliability of their products in
practice but, above all, to refer their customers to any hazards in daily operation – including
those that arise from the application or installation of accessories of other manufacturers. [37]
28.4.8 Steps for Internationally Agreed Best Practices
Due to their networking and complexity, it will be difﬁcult to get a clear overview about
all the risks of automated vehicles in series operation. Therefore the objective is estab-
lishing worldwide agreed best practices for legislation, liability, standards, risk assess-
ment, ethics and tests.
The ADAS Code of Practice as a result of the Response 3 project was a fundamental
step towards European agreed and legally binding guidelines for Advanced Driver
Assistance Systems (ADAS). ADAS were characterized by all of the following properties:
They support the driver in the primary driving task, provide active support for lateral and/or
longitudinal control with or without warning, detect and evaluate the vehicle environment,
use complex signal processing and interact direct between the driver and the system [5].
Primarily ADAS operate rule based at the maneuvering level (between about one and ten
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seconds) and furthermore within parts of the skill based stabilization level (time spans less
than one second). High and fully automated vehicles will intervene in a knowledge-, skill-
and rule based manner for more than one second at all driving levels (see Fig. 28.8).
In general increasing sensitivity for defects is visible through a signiﬁcant growth in
product recalls worldwide. If unknown failures appear after vehicles have gone into
production, appropriate measures have to be taken where necessary according to a risk
assessment.
For analyzing and evaluating risks stemming from product defects after market launch—
in view of the necessity and urgency of product recalls—the EU and the German Federal
Motor Transport Authority (Kraftfahrtbundesamt) uses tables from the rapid alert system
RAPEX (Rapid Exchange of Information System) [38]. To classify risks, ﬁrst accident
Fig. 28.8 Worldwide agreed legislation, liability, standards, ethics and tests for high-/fully
automated vehicles with integration of knowledge based navigation, skill based stabilization and
rule based maneuvering levels (globe = outer circle). Further development of the Response 3 ADAS
Code of Practice for active longitudinal and lateral support or intervention in dangerous situations
(ADAS = blue circle). Image rights: Author
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severity (extend of damage S according to AIS, for example) and probability of harm are
assessed—similarly to theALARPprinciple (As LowAsReasonably Possible) [39], the ISO
26262 standard [27], and ADASCode of Practice for active longitudinal and lateral support.
The degree of risk is derived from this. Final assessment concerning the urgency of required
measures looks at the risk of injury for those at particular risk of being injured (as influenced
by age, state of health, etc.) and hazard for a mentally healthy adult, and the use of protective
measures as appropriate warnings (see Fig. 28.9).
28.5 Conclusion and Outlook
On the one hand, society’s expectations are understandable as they increasingly require
the highest, state-of-the-art levels of safety for new technologies. On the other hand,
unrealistic demands for technical perfection and the striving for 100 % fault-free operation
may hinder automated vehicles being launched on the market, and thus the chance of
revolutionary potential beneﬁts.
Many groundbreaking technologies would not be available to us today had caution and
reservation gained the upper hand during their introduction. One example of courageous
innovation is provided by the German engineer and car pioneer Carl Friedrich Benz. As
early as 1885, he completed the ﬁrst test drives with his prototype, the properly func-
tioning Benz Patent-Motorwagen. In his book Lebensfahrt eines Erﬁnders, Benz
remembers about his ﬁrst trip:
Until that point, it had been at great preference to undertake my test drives far away from the
city – on factory grounds or outside on the old, lonely ramparts (ring road), which at that time
still went around the city of Mannheim and was hardly walked on –, I no longer shied away
from people and their criticism from spring 1886 on. [40]
Fig. 28.9 Risk assessment and derivation of essential measures in accordance with RAPEX,
ALARP and ISO 26262. Sources RAPEX, ADAS Code of Practice, ISO 26262, ALARP. Image
rights: Author
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As the motorcar lay motionless with a breakdown, however, Benz attracted pity, scorn,
and derision:
How can one sit in such an unreliable, squalid, ear-splitting mechanical box. (…) If I had such
a stinking box, I would stay home. [40]
Despite all the denial and rejection with which his unceasing work through countless
nights for his mission of life was received, Benz, with the support of his wife, held ﬁrm to
his belief in the future of his Patent-Wagen. Thus he became a trailblazer for one of the
most signiﬁcant innovations of modern mobility.
The preparation of vehicles with advanced degrees of automation likewise requires a
determined approach in the mold of Benz. The market launch of highly and fully auto-
mated vehicles has also had barriers placed in its path. The ﬁrst vendors on the market—
the pioneers—therefore take on increased risks at the outset, so that the potential total
beneﬁt of these new technologies to society can only be achieved together with all
interdisciplinary networking parties. Homann describes these decision conflicts during
market launch by the decision-theory concept of the so-called “Prisoner’s Dilemma”. To
overcome this dilemma as it pertains to highly and fully automated vehicles, the incal-
culable risks for manufacturers must be made assessable and determinable through new
institutional arrangements [41]. Unconditional information and transparent policy
encourage and accelerate public discourse across all disciplines.
Due to previous licensing requirements for series production vehicles, drivers almost
always have to keep their hands on the steering wheel and permanently stay in control of
the vehicle. Automated research vehicles and vehicle development from IT companies, car
manufacturers, and component suppliers will also be required to have a human driver as a
responsible backup level in complex trafﬁc situations for the nearby future.
Driverless vehicles, on the other hand, signify the beginning of an utterly new
dimension. New approaches and activities are essential [42]. It is required to orientate
ourselves to the future potential of automated driving functions, to learn from previous
patterns and within the bounds of what is technically and economically reasonable and
adjust old methods to validly state of the art or state of science [43].
Besides generally clarifying who is responsible for accident and product risks, new
accompanying measures depending on different automation and development levels (see
Fig. 28.6) will also be of use for a successful market launch and safe operation. This
includes identifying relevant scenarios, environments, system conﬁgurations and driver
characteristics. Relevant maneuvers of driving robots have to be deﬁned and assessed for
example using accident data (see Chap. 17) and virtual methods. Further investigation of
real driving situations in comparison with system speciﬁcations and additional tests on
proving grounds, car clinics, ﬁeld tests, human driver training or special vehicle studies are
recommended. For the required exchange of information, storage of vehicle data (e.g. Event
Data Recorder) and possible criminal attacks protective technical measures are necessary
(see Chaps. 25, 30). Beside challenging and agreed data protection guidelines [44], experts
in technology ethics will ensure compliance with ethical values (see Figs. 28.3, 28.6, 28.7).
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Within this, safety requirements have to be answered in terms of “How safe is safe enough?”
Expert experience can also decisively contribute in increasing safety and meeting customer
expectations for acceptable risks. In light of increasing consumer demands, such experience
—particularly of previous product liability actions—makes a valuable contribution to
improving product safety during development and approval stages.
Before highly complex automated vehicle technologies—which will additionally be
applied in a multi-layered overall system—can go into mass commercialization, inter-
disciplinary concerted development and sign-off processes are required. A reliable eval-
uation for sustainable solutions ready for production demands new harmonized methods
for comparable safety veriﬁcation, e.g. by simulating relevant scenarios [45, 46] including
the planning of ﬁeld tests [47] from worldwide available and combined accident-,
trafﬁc-flow-, weather- and vehicle operation data (see Chap. 17). This also applies to
fulﬁlling legal and licensing regulations, identifying new options for risk distribution (see
[42]), and creating new compensation schemes. To verify the duty of care in existing
quality management systems, it is recommended to further develop experience-based,
internationally valid guidelines with checklists built on the previous ADAS Code of
Practice [5, 48]. These standards will further embody and document state of the art and
science within the bounds of technical suitability and economic feasibility. The former
ADAS Code of Practice was developed to provide safe Advanced Driver Assistance
Systems, with active support of the main driving task (lateral and/or longitudinal control,
including automated emergency brake interventions—AEB), on the market and published
2009 by the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA). It corresponds
with the ISO 26262 for requirements of electrical, electronic and software components. As
a development guideline it contains recommendations for analysis and assessment of
ADAS-Human-Machine-Interactions with occurrence during normal use and in case of
failure [5, 6]. With increasing level of automation, upgrades of functional safety, con-
trollability (ISO 26262, ADAS Code of Practice) and other standardized methods will be
necessary such as virtual simulation [45, 46]. Today the standards do not cover functional
disabilities for instance misinterpretation of objects, trafﬁc situations and resulting false
positive system interventions. An integral, scenario based approach is recommended
because automated systems will be able to control scenarios. In the event of serious
malfunctions that threaten severe damage, product experts from the development process
should be involved in the study of the causes and be listened to. With regard to future
court decisions, motor vehicle experts who are not directly involved in the development
should acquire the expertise to be prepared for a specialist appraisal of new technologies.
In the development of automated driving, networked thinking covering all disciplines
is required with a flexible, yet structured area for action. So far, the development has
opened up an unknown world with many uncertainties that may cause reservation and
resistance. For a successful launch of automated vehicles ready for production, insights
collected in vivo from both the past as well as the present are essential prerequisites.
Despite the technical, legal, and economic risks, production readiness will be of beneﬁt to
society in this way.
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